ࡱ>    !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz|}~Root EntryZ O20`<|{CONTENTS CompObjVSPELLING  -enforced law and publicly-produced and -enforced law, and then examining the cases of Igboland in western Africa and Zululand in southern Africa, this paper will conclude that decentralized, non-monopolized forms of law provide societies with a powerful tool of resistance to be used against the massive power of the colonial state. The creation and implementation of law has been a task of humans since they first discovered the scarce nature of their universe and the need to cooperate with one another. As economist, historian, and philosopher Murray Rothbard shows, property is merely a response to scarcity and law is, properly, the accepted set of rules by which property is maintained in a given society.# The work of economist and philosopher Hans Hoppe further elucidates the nature of law. He divides existing legal codes into the two broad categories of private and public. Laws created and administered on a voluntary, non-monopolistic basis (that is, anyone can theoretically enter into the practice of producing legal codes, adjudicating disputes, and providing physical protective services) can be considered stateless or private laws. Laws created and administered on an involuntary basis with a  territorial monopolist of law and order acting as the ultimate judge in all cases including those involving itself, can be considered state or public laws.# The first case this paper will examine is that of Igboland in the southern Niger delta region which was colonized by the British in the late nineteenth century. The political organizations of Igbo societies were extremely varied. Many were ruled by kings, others by a plutocracy, and still others by a council of respected men of the community.# Societies with the latter form of organization will be the focCHNKWKS TEXTTEXTxFDPPFDPPFDPPFDPPFDPCFDPCFDPCFDPCFDPCFDPCFDPCFDPCSTSHSTSH(STSHSTSH(SYIDSYIDSGP SGP INK INK BTEPPLC BTECPLC 0FONTFONTHTTOKNPLC TFTN FTN ~FTN FTN n~STRSPLC Hs Hoppe furt Anthony Comegna Senior Seminar in Comparative History--Paper III Dr. Catherine Clay 1 December, 2009 Anarchy, State, and Empire: A Comparative Study of Igbos, Zulus, and British Imperialism Throughout the twentieth century, much scholarly attention was focused on the peripheries of the world, the emerging and developing areas of the planet such as South America, South-east Asia, and Africa. These areas also happened to be the sites formerly dominated by European colonial structures. Throughout their world-wide empires, European states encountered myriad new societies and civilizations and presided over a litany of diverse social, economic, and political systems, some of which helped facilitate their rule and others which greatly hindered and complicated the colonial process. When studying colonial history, it appears that certain broad generalities can be devised that indicate which forms of society are more conducive to being conquered by colonial powers and which are more likely to prevent, discourage, or even overturn such a process. Historiographically, this relationship has largely been absent from the literature since the writings of British colonial agents themselves, such as anthropologist C.K. Meek and the mastermind of the indirect rule system, Lord Lugard. As will be seen below, recent historians have tended to focus on describing Igbo and Zulu legal institutions and the interactions between the indigenous peoples and colonial forces rather than questioning the mechanism through which colonial rule was subverted or strengthened. Using the comparative historical method, this paper seeks to discover trends relating to this very question. By first defining  the State and fleshing out the distinguishing characteristics of privately-produced andus of this discussion. Such councils serve as rough cognates to the modern city councilmen or boards of aldermen. Together, they made the critical decisions for the rest of their town. They decided punishments for many crimes, conducted foreign policy for the town, pronounced judgment upon those guilty of social violations, and facilitated the prosperousness of their town by maintaining certain  public goods, such as water sources and walkways. Their authority derived from the respect accorded them by their fellows Igbo villagers. Historically, if one Igbo community of the delta region came into conflict with another and the strict social bonds of family and friendship could not help resolve the dispute the British colonial agent and anthropologist, C. K. Meek, states that  the king of Onitsha was frequently appealed to as arbiter, however he makes clear that  the power of the king of Onitsha was small. # This relationship demonstrates the general Igbo preference for arbitration and socially regulated adjudication versus coercive monopolism in the production and maintenance of law and order. Council decisions were almost entirely accepted without complaint by the village because of the resultant intense social pressure if they were not followed. Because of the presence of socially maintained law instead of forcibly maintained law, it can be said that the Igbo followed an anarchic or private system of law as opposed to a statist, public law. Law in Igbo communities tended to flow from the font of religious belief through the individual and, with his sanction, was administered first and foremost by one s family, town, clan, and arbiters respectively. Meek states that  [a]mong most people of the world religion is& the handmaiden of the law, and that  [a]mong the Ibo [sic] religion and law are so closely interwoven that many of the most powerful legal sanctions are derived directly from the gods. Thus, practically every Igbo law derived, to some extent, from Igbo religious beliefs.# Among the Igbos there existed a great respect for authority boundaries. For example, the chief priest, or okpara, was not permitted to intervene in the affairs of a family. This highly decentralized Igbo legal system had various forms of enforcement, often including a head chief, a council of lower chiefs greatly checking the power of the head chief, a chief warrior, acting as a strongman protector who was empowered with the ability to arrest and punish anyone including the head chief called Okute, and an Iyase (the Igbo cognate to the western common law judge), who was empowered by the community (because of his great wisdom and respectability) to decide in many cases and refer others to the head chief. It is important to recognize that each Igbo community differed (often greatly) in its administrative framework; however, all followed a similar pattern.# The key to determining whether a legal code is anarchic and, therefore voluntary ,or coercive and, therefore statist, is the existence of barriers to entry into the production and maintenance of a system of law and order.# In modern Western nations, for example, governments create and enforce laws using tax revenues and a monopoly over the legal systems of their respective citizens. The Igbos , however, did not compulsorily fund a governmental organization and there was a large degree of Montesquieian separation of powers and fierce limitations on the aggressive punishments the Igbo leaders were allowed to dole out to their subjects, yet they were indeed still quasi-monopolists of the machinery of law and order in many cases. Most violations of property rights were handled quite simply and peacefully by the judicious application of social and religious pressure, however one cannot help but imagine that if the dictates of the goddesses and gods were not heeded, though no rights would have been violated by the supposed perpetrator, the council would most certainly apply coercive means to force the violator into submission to its monopolistic will and appease the angry deities for the sake of the village and its well-being. Such a legal structure does not easily fit into the anarchic, purely stateless, private law or the statist, public law categories; however it is very close to the anarchic end of the spectrum. As the British system of colonialism was being imposed on the societies of the lower Niger, the colonizers encountered many problems. Europeans routinely had to overcome local customs and legal systems in order to effectively and efficiently colonize the areas. This difficult process was particularly thorny in the lower Niger region. Because of the semi-stateless system of law and order in many Igbo societies, it was extremely difficult for the British system of indirect rule to work effectively. The British relied upon establishing an interconnected and bureaucratic network of European officials commanding and supervising the actions of African agents operating within various African communities. Because so many Igbo societies did not possess such men of power and influence, the British opted to install outsiders, the so-called  warrant chiefs, who often did not even speak the language much less understand the Igbo law and customs. These  warrant chiefs performed the same actions as other indirect rule chieftaincies; however, they were deeply resented by those over whom they ruled and were frequently subverted to disastrous effect for the colonial masters.# Actions of civil unrest such as the Ega Tax  Riot of 1918 and the Aba  Riots of 1929 were the results of the policy of indirect rule. Such revolts against oppressive taxation and British imposition of rule on the Igbos continued to hamper the system of indirect rule in southern Nigeria. Yet it was the complete inability to impose a British-dominated legal order which caused the complete breakdown of the imperial model such that Lord Lugard, the originator of the indirect rule system, declared that  the system of so-called  Native Courts under  Warrant Chiefs had proved a disastrous failure in both their Administrative and Judicial functions. # Indeed, British rule in the Niger region of West Africa was so tenuous that it is no surprise that Nigeria--including the Igboland hotbed of anti-British activity--was granted independent self-rule as early as 1960, long before most of Britain s African holdings ripped themselves free from the lion s claws.# In Zululand, the political structure was quite the reverse. The Zulu Kingdom (or Empire) was a rigidly centralized and autocratic state supremely ruled by the king. Founded by Shaka kaSenzangakhona, simply called Shaka Zulu, in the mid-1820s, the Zulu Kingdom united many southern African clans into a massive and expansionistic central state. Socially and culturally, the clans which comprised the Zulu Kingdom were extremely diverse and exhibited vast differences. Politically and economically, however, hegemony either developed organically or was enforced by conquering Zulu warriors. The economy was focused on producing cattle and a few agricultural products for trade with neighboring Africans as well as small groups of European traders. Cattle was so important to the Zulu peoples that it virtually became the primary medium of exchange and dominated the social and political landscape. Cattle provided tax revenues to the king, determined one s position in the social hierarchy, and provided much-needed dietary nourishment. Possessing fearsome warriors, a thriving cattle economy, and a tremendous drive to power, Shaka Zulu forged his state through an onslaught of terrible destruction and violence, subjugating clan by clan in a protracted series of military campaigns.# Naturally, then, the Zulu king s power and authority depended almost entirely upon his military might and the awe it inspired in his people. The long tradition of Zulu praise poetry provides historians with an excellent set of source materials through which to view Zulu relations with their leaders.# Shaka is referred to as  He who is famous as he sits& He who beats but is not beaten, and constant references are made to Shaka s own personal dynamism. In contrast to the Igbo respect for community, the Zulu praise poems show a distinct fhrherprinzip reverence of power per se. The sagas are concerned entirely with Shaka s military conquests and his developing cult of personality. Shaka s reputation as the  Little leopard that goes about preventing other little leopards, clearly shows that Shaka s praisers recognized him as a monopolistic slayer of governmental competition and that they respected and revered him for exactly that.# Accordingly, Zulu law and order flowed directly from the font of governmental authority. Zulu peoples depended entirely upon the forcefulness of the king to provide the vast empire with structure and stability. As Gump states,  Politically, authority devolved in relation to the Zulu ruling house. At the highest level was the king, the senior member of the Zulu ruling lineage, and the royal family. The closest advisers to the Zulu king were territorial chiefs known as izikhulu. # Though there was a fair amount of decentralization in the local governing structure, ultimate and final authority resided entirely in the personage of the king. As Fynn notes, under the rule of Shaka Zulu, territorial chiefs powers were  merely nominal as no chief would dare to propose anything in opposition to the king, as such conduct would be detrimental to his future safety. # The massive Zulu state was financed by an intricate and demanding system of cattle and crop taxation provided directly to the king. Quite out of character though enjoyable nonetheless, praise poetry also refers to Shaka Zulu as the  Lazy one that eats the corn of the diligent ones, indicating a fair amount of popular restlessness with the demanding needs of the State.# The king would then distribute his own personal cattle to lower chiefs to both to ensure their loyalty and to provide them income. The rule of the Zulu kings and, therefore, the ideological basis for the rule of law in Zululand, was reinforced by dozens of aggrandizing state and local rituals and sacrifices for the health of the Zulu ruling family and the king s amabutho.# Unquestionably, the Zulu government qualified as a stringent, centralized, highly monopolized state. Lungunza kaMpukane quite properly observed that  The Zulu country was like a pit, or a snuffbox, for you did not know where to run to; that is, if a man had to be killed it was inevitable that he would be killed, for there was nowhere else to run to. In Igboland, villagers who disagreed with the decisions of the councils were free to appeal to higher arbiters or leave the village but there was only one source of law and order in Zululand, and no others were permitted to compete with him.# Yet once the process of British colonialism had been set in motion by the powers that were, what sort of remedy did the Zulu political system offer its people? As the British army swept through Zululand and conquered territory after territory while attempting to seize the elusive king Ceteshwayo, they were able to opportunistically substitute one monopolist for another with relative ease. The diary of Sir Garnet Wolseley, whose command replaced that of the Isandhlwana-tainted Lord Chelmsford,# is most helpful in examining the British method of this substitution of monopoly for monopoly: All& the Coast Chiefs assembled today& I told them that we were not & had never been at war with the Zulu people: our dispute was with Cetewayo [sic] who had been guilty of cruelties to his people: that he took life without trial & that under his rule neither life nor property were even safe& That he should never again be King of Zululand. That I intended to divide the country into four or five Districts: that I should name the Chiefs who were to exercise independent & sovereign power in those Districts& That Cetewayo s [sic] army having been beaten by ours in the open, we might in accordance with Zulu customs& appropriate their country& As a sign of their submission all must lay down their arms & make over to me all the cattle they had in their charge belonging to the King. [Emphasis added.]# Here, Wolseley perfectly illustrates the British method of indirect rule which so splendidly failed in Igboland. After defeating the pre-British monopolist of law and order (the Zulu King Ceteshwayo) he seamlessly installs another system of monopolistic law and order albeit slightly more decentralized. While offering bribes to the Zulu chiefs (much like the Zulu kings did, as discussed above), Wolseley maintains a clear transition of monopolistic power from the king to the British first by explicitly recognizing the  rightful devolution of power from the British authorities to the Zulu chiefs and second by reserving all previously royal revenues to his own administration. As Wolseley recognizes, the Zulu predisposition for such a system of government functions to facilitate the British subjugation of Zululand. While, unlike in Igboland, indirect rule was a success among the Zulu, the Zulu peoples did not all simply submit to their new lords and masters. Much like in the case of British Igboland, British Zululand was also rocked by rebellions against imperial rule. In 1906, Zulu dissatisfaction with the British imposition of burdensome poll taxes came to a roiling boil and burst middle and southern Zululand into rebellious flames. As opposed to the cases of the Igbo tax riots, the Zulu opposition took the forms of organized militia movements and even pitched battles. Significantly, the most prominent figurehead in the rebellion became Dinuzulu, the heir of Ceteshwayo. As historian Shula Marks states,  [P]rominent chiefs conducted guerrilla warfare against the white troops for nearly a month, making use of Dinuzulu s name as his authority and using also the war-cry and war-badge of the Zulu kings. # Even the movements against British rule were still movements based on the support of one monopolist over another. While the 1906-8 rebellion  [heightened the] awareness of Africans as active participants in society and not simply the passive recipients of governmental decrees, and was the largest factor in obtaining a significant amount of Natalian self-rule in the developing Union of South Africa, the  enormous cost in lives and ultimate lack of true self-rule demonstrates a broad failure in the Zulu method of rebellion. A comparative view of the Igbo and the Zulu systems of law and order and the responses of those systems to British imperialism can help illuminate many themes and trends in the history of imperialism. First, such a perspective provides the historian with a clear portrait of distinctly different legal systems and the mechanics of each. It appears that the Igbo legal system properly fits into neither the anarchic legal structure nor the statist legal structure, but rather is a blending of the two. The lack of institutionalized, heavily monopolized, and imperious governmental legal structures in Igbo society demonstrate the anarchic, stateless, privately-produced legal order, however the coercive governance and religious order imposed by the councils of elders including the exclusion of women from legal decisions demonstrate the statist, publicly-produced legal order. The Zulu, however, possessed a rigid and clearly centralized, statist legal order. The Zulu king commanded absolute rule over all of his domain, exacted a heavy toll from his people, distributed hefty and lucrative doses of patronage to loyal chiefs, and demanded economics, military, and spiritual reverence from all of his subjects without exception. The centralized planning of the Zulu government is perhaps best seen in the imperious restrictions on marriage and other aspects of personal lives.# Second, it is obvious that the legal structure of the colonized peoples significantly affected the patterns of colonial rule imposed upon them. In Igboland, the decentralized, non-monopolistic legal order prevented the imposition of an effective British colonial structure whereas the British were easily able to substitute their own monopolistic governing structure in place of that of the Zulu kings. It is important to recognize that in both cases, cultural preferences or predispositions for one type of law and order over others was the critical factor in determining the success of the colonial structure imposed by the British. Community-focused Igboland was unable to be tamed and governed by the  warrant chiefs who had not attained the communities respects. In Zululand this problem was non-existent because power and military ability was respected for its own sake. Third, because Igbo political dynamism as a result of decentralized, privately-maintained law is precisely what created problems for the British colonizers--and because the problems were intractably entrenched in Igbo society--the British were never able to assert a large amount of sustainable control over the Igbos. Precisely this lack of power resulted in relative peace throughout the lower Niger region during the period of British rule. In Zululand, however, the social preference for a centralized, monopolistic governing structure and the desire to reinstitute the Zulu royalty resulted in the massive loss of life through military conflict. In comparing these dynamics between two sets of African peoples in the period following the Scramble for Africa and their reactions to British colonial rule, historians can see the effects of a particular legal system on a society s ability to prevent, discourage, and overthrow an imperial order. The lack of a centralized and monopolistic legal order in Igboland prevented the British from supplanting traditional Igbo law and order while the Zulu governmental monopoly allowed this process to take place with considerable ease. In Igboland, the British had no authorities to convince or coerce into collaboration with the imperial structure and, therefore, witnessed the complete implosion of the indirect rule system. In Zululand, the British were able to so successfully appeal to such monopolistic authorities that the only form of resistance available to those who preferred true Zulu self-rule was military. Indeed, the comparison of these two cases demonstrates that when imperial governments attempt to impose monopolistic rule over foreign peoples, those societies without corresponding legal structures appear to be the most resistant, resilient, and successful in discouraging, repelling, resisting, and overcoming the imperial process. Bibliography Akurang-Parry, Kwabena.  Indirect Rule and Colonial Rule. (lecture notes, Shippensburg University, Shippensburg, PA, Fall 2008). Cope, Trevor, Ed. Izibongo: Zulu Praise Poems. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968). Davidson, Basil. Modern Africa: A Social and Political History. (London: Longman, 1983). Gump, James. Dust Rose Like Smoke: The Subjugation of the Zulu and the Sioux. (Lincoln: The University of Nebraska Press, 1994). Hoppe, Hans-Hermann. Democracy, the God That Failed: The Economics and Politics of Monarchy, Democracy, and Natural Order. Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick. 2001. Lugard, Frederick. Foreward to Law and Authority in A Nigerian Tribe: A Study in Indirect Rule, Forward by Lord Lugard by C.K. Meek. Barnes & Noble, Inc.: New York. 1937. Marks, Shula. Reluctant Rebellion: The 1906-8 Disturbances in Natal. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970). Meek, C.K. Law and Authority in A Nigerian Tribe: A Study in Indirect Rule, Forward by Lord Lugard. Barnes & Noble, Inc.: New York. 1937. Preston, Adrian, ed. The South African Journal of Sir Garnet Wolseley, 1879-1880. (Cape Town: A. A. Balkema, 1973). Rothbard, Murray. The Ethics of Liberty, 2nd Edition. New York University Press: New York. 1998. Thomas, Northcote. Anthropological Report on Ibo-Speaking Peoples of Nigeria, Part IV: Law and Custom of the Ibo of the Asaba District, S. Nigeria. Negro Universities Press: New York. 1914. # Rothbard, Murray. The Ethics of Liberty, 2nd Edition. (New York University Press: New York) 1998. # Hoppe, Hans-Hermann. Democracy, the God That Failed: The Economics and Politics of Monarchy, Democracy, and Natural Order. (Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick, 2001). 1-43. The debate over which of the above methods of legal order is the superior method is rich indeed, however it cannot be given adequate treatment here. For further reading on the lesser-known method, that of stateless or private law, please see Tannehill, Morris & Linda. The Market for Liberty. (The Ludwig von Mises Institute: Auburn, 1970).; Benson, Bruce. The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State. (The Ludwig von Mises Institute: Auburn, 2008).; Rothbard, Murray. The Ethics of Liberty. (The Ludwig von Mises Institute: Auburn, 1998).; Spooner, Lysander. No Treason: The Constitution of No Authority. (Libertarian Publishers, 1976).; Bastiat, Frederic. The Law. (G.P. Putnams & Sons, 1874.; Byock, Jesse. Medieval Iceland: Society, Sagas, and Power. (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1988).; Anderson, Terry & Hill, Peter. The Not So Wild, Wild West: Property Rights on the Frontier. (Stanford University Press: Stanford, 2004). # Meek, C.K. Law and Authority in A Nigerian Tribe: A Study in Indirect Rule, Forward by Lord Lugard. (Barnes & Noble, Inc.: New York, 1937). 1-19. # Ibid. 13. # Ibid. 20. # Thomas, Northcote. Anthropological Report on Ibo-Speaking Peoples of Nigeria, Part IV: Law and Custom of the Ibo of the Asaba District, S. Nigeria. Negro Universities Press: New York, 1914). 38-57. # This too is the subject of great debate. For more on this topic, see footnote #2 as well as Benson, Bruce.  Enforcement of Private Property Rights in Primitive Societies: Law Without Government. The Journal of Libertarian Studies vol. 9, no. 1 (Winter 1989). # Akurang-Parry, Kwabena.  Indirect Rule and Colonial Rule. (lecture notes, Shippensburg University, Shippensburg, PA, Fall 2008). # Lugard, Foreward to Law and Authority in A Nigerian Tribe, by C.K. Meek. # Basil Davidson, Modern Africa: A Social and Political History, (London: Longman, 1983), 137. # James Gump, Dust Rose Like Smoke: The Subjugation of the Zulu and the Sioux, (Lincoln: The University of Nebraska Press, 1994) 32-33. # Trevor Cope, Ed. Izibongo: Zulu Praise Poems, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968.) 83-87. # Ibid. 88-117. The rest of the praise poems also indicate such values, although they are not relevant enough to be belabored here. # Gump, Dust Rose Like Smoke, 48. # J. Stuart & D Malcolm, The Diary of Henry Francis Fynn, (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter and Shooter, 1950). 283-284. Quoted in Gump, Dust Rose Like Smoke, 48. # Cope, Izibongo, 114. # Gump, Dust Rose Like Smoke, 49. # Quoted in Ibid. 53. # Ibid. 98-99. # Adrian Preston, ed. The South African Journal of Sir Garnet Wolseley, 1879-1880. (Cape Town: A. A. Balkema, 1973). 59. Emphasis added. For a fuller, more in-depth analysis of such effects, see Bruch Nicholls,  Zululand 1887-1889: The Court of the Special Commissioners for Zululand and the Rule of Law, The Journal of Natal and Zulu History 15, 1995, regarding the colonizing effects of Zulu peoples looking to the monopolistic British court system to adjudicate disputes which they would otherwise have taken to the court of the Zulu kings. # Shula Marks, Reluctant Rebellion: The 1906-8 Disturbances in Natal (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970.) xv-xxv. # Gump, Dust Rose Like Smoke, 47. rt IV: Law and Custom of the Ibo of the Asaba District, S. Nigeria. Negro Universities Press: New York, 1914). 38-57. # This too is the subject of great debate. For more on this topic, see f;")-4?PZ@bnsPx~ P&. .ҲL >0~Zjl.Drrrrrrrrrnnnnnnnnn "4"(2"'( X- 0Z  " "4"5% 4" "4"5% 4"5%4"5%4"5%P2vx<~8%:%.(@(t((--..111144^6`6$I&IJNLNPPZZ2]4]_2_Z_f_bef ffiillnnnnssww|"}}l~rrrrrrrrrrr. 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